A comparison of spinozas belief of substance and that of leibniz from his discourse on metaphysics
They were published in Germany and in England soon after the correspondence ceased and became one of the most widely read philosophical books of the 18th Century. Spinoza justifies this move defensively; at E1P10s Spinoza claims that nothing we know about the attributes entails that they must belong to different substances, and consequently there is nothing illegitimate about claiming that a substance may have more than one attribute.
Leibniz god
Metaphysics: A Primer on Substance I consider the notion of substance to be one of the keys to the true philosophy. On the other hand, we know a posteriori that something is possible merely through experience, for the actual existence of a thing is proof of its possibility. Leibniz's point seems to be that we could peer into a nearby possible world where a Peter-counterpart did not deny Christ. Caesar is not anecessary being. For Leibniz tells us in On Freedom De libertate This smacks of determinism and raises in its own way the problem of future contingents. Impossibility: A proposition is impossible if and only if it is not true in any possible world.But what is the character of these non-actualized possibles? Answer: for the moral evaluation taking place in the divine intellect.
It is probably most helpful, then, to see Leibniz's philosophy as a reaction to two sets of modern opponents: on the one hand, Descartes and his followers; on the other hand, Hobbes and Spinoza.
Leibniz rationalism
Nevertheless, every monad is synchronized with one another by God, according to his vast conception of the perfect universe. The world-books are on permanent display in the divine intellect. Could the alligator count as a counterpart of Adam? Thus, Cartesian corporeal substance, the essence of which is simply extension, cannot exist as substance. The reply is easy: otherwise he would not be this man. Space is nothing but the order of co-existent objects; time nothing but the order of successive events. That is, space and time are internal or intrinsic features of the complete concepts of things, not extrinsic.PII Now, it was said above that Leibniz excludes purely extrinsic denominations or relational properties from the kinds of properties that are constitutive of an individual.
There is, however, a common way to reconcile the two views: the Divine Choice Theory literally explains the origin of this world, and the Striving Possibles Theory is merely a metaphor. Indeed, according to Leibniz, animals operate not as mere automata as they do in the Cartesian philosophy, but rather have fairly sophisticated mental faculties.
Thus, even in a deep and dreamless sleep, the mind is active, and perceptions are in the mind. However, Leibniz may have a point in arguing that it would be absurd in some sense for an infinite being to choose anything other than an infinitely rich and thus perfect universe.
